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INTRODUCTION

It is unclear exactly how many of the 3,228 inmates on death row'
are mentally incompetent.
A BBC report placed the number at
approximately 10%.2 Some clinical studies have found as many as 40%3
or even 70%4 of surveyed inmates are psychotic. Whether the actual
number of death row inmates suffering from mental illness is 10% or
70%, mentally ill inmates represent a considerable portion of the death
row population and pose unique challenges for the criminal justice
system.s
In July 2008, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that two of
these mentally ill death row inmates, Thavirak Sam 6 and Herbert

1. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Capital Punishment 2006, Table 4 (2007),
availableat http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/html/cp/2006/tables/cpO6stO4.htm.
2. See Julie D. Cantor, Of Pills and Needles: Involuntarily Medicating the
Psychotic Inmate when Execution Looms, 2 IND. HEALTH L. REv. 117, 136 (2005) (citing
ABC Online, Foreign Correspondent: U.S.A.-Death Row Medication, available at
http://www.abc.net.au/foreign/stories/s894253.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2009) (on file
with the INDIANA HEALTH LAW REVIEW)); cf Bureau of Justice Statistics, Mental Health
Problems of Prison and Jail Inmates (2006), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf (reporting 11.8% of state prison inmates and 7.8% of federal prison
inmates experienced delusions within a 12 month period or since admission to prison).
3. See Dorothy Otnow Lewis et al., Psychiatric, Neurological, and
Psychoeducational Characteristicsof 15 Death Row Inmates in the United States, 143
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 838 (1986) (claiming 40% of surveyed adult death row inmates
suffered from chronic psychosis).
4. See Cantor, supra note 2, at 136 (citing ROBERT JOHNSON, DEATH WORK: A
STUDY OF THE MODERN EXECUTION PROCESS 50 (1990) (estimating 70% of death row
inmates suffer from mental illness)); Brian J. Kane, The Charles Singleton Dilemma:
Sane Enough to Die, 28 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 149, 150 (2004) (citing Rhonda K.
Jenkins, Fit To Die: Drug-Induced Competency for the Purpose of Execution, 20 S. ILL.
U. L.J. 149 (1995)).
5. See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (forbidding execution of
death row inmates); Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 2003) (permitting forced
medication to render inmate competent to execute); State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746 (La.
1992) (forbidding forced medication to render inmate competent to execute);
Commonwealth v. Watson, 952 A.2d 541 (Pa. 2008) (permitting forced medication for
death row inmate to render him competent to determine whether he wishes to pursue
collateral appeals).
6. See Commonwealth v. Sam, 952 A.2d 565 (Pa. 2008). Thavirak Sam was
convicted of three counts of first-degree murder and was sentenced to three consecutive
death sentences in 1991. Id. at 568. The evidence presented at his trial, established that
Sam shot and killed his two-year-old niece, his mother-in-law, and his brother-in-law. Id.
His conviction was upheld on direct appeal. Id.
In 2000, Sam was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, and was deemed
incompetent to participate in his PCRA proceedings. Id. The Commonwealth filed a
motion to compel psychiatric medication, which Sam opposed. Id. at 568-69. The PCRA
court ultimately denied the Commonwealth's motion, and the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court reversed. Id. at 589.
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Watson,' could be forcibly medicated to render them competent to
determine whether they wished to pursue collateral relief under
Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).8 This appears to be
the first time a court of last resort has resolved the issue raised by Sam
and Watson.
This comment analyzes whether forcibly medicating an incompetent
death row inmate for this limited purpose is permissible, under existing
federal law. Part II provides a brief background to legal issues related to
the treatment of mentally ill prisoners including executing the mentally
ill, forcibly medicating a non-consenting inmate, and forcibly medicating
death row inmates to render them competent to execute. Part III
describes the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decisions in Commonwealth
v. Sam9 and Commonwealth v. Watson.10 Part IV analyzes Sam and
Watson in light of the United States Supreme Court's decisions in
Washington v. Harper," Riggins v. Nevada,12 and Sell v. United States."
Finally, Part V considers some possible alternatives to Pennsylvania's
treatment of death row inmates who, like Thavirak Sam and Herbert
Watson, are not competent to determine whether they wish to pursue
collateral relief.
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

This
treatment
historical
mentally

section discusses some of the legal issues related to the
of mentally ill death row inmates. First, it will review the
prohibition on, and one time authorization of, executing
incompetent death row inmates. Next, it will provide an

7. See Watson, 952 A.2d at 541. Herbert Watson was convicted of first-degree
murder and aggravated assault and was sentenced to death in 1983. Id. at 544-45. The
evidence presented at trial established that on June 15, 1982, Watson grabbed his
estranged girlfriend, Sheryl Harding, from a closet where she was hiding with her two
children and shot her twice. Commonwealth v. Watson, 523 Pa. 51, 55 (Pa. 1989). He
left the room and reloaded his gun, and then returned and shot Harding one more time.
Id. His conviction was upheld on direct appeal. Id. at 70.
In 2001, Watson's counsel filed an amended PCRA petition. Watson, 952 A.2d at
545. Following a Commonwealth motion to dismiss, Watson sent a series of letters to the
PCRA court stating he had fired his counsel and wished to withdraw his appeal. Id. Four
experts determined Watson was incompetent, and on May 20, 2004, the Commonwealth
requested the PCRA Court compel Watson to take psychiatric medication to render him
competent to determine whether he wished to pursue PCRA relief. Id. The PCRA court
ultimately denied the Commonwealth's motion and appointed his mother next friend. Id.
at 550. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 563.
8. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(3) (2008).
9. Sam, 952 A.2d 565.
10. Watson, 952 A.2d 541.
11. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
12. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
13. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
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overview of key Supreme Court cases involving the forced medication of
inmates. Finally, it will consider the legality of medicating a death row
inmate for the purpose of rendering him competent to execute.
A.

Execution of the Mentally Ill

In Ford v. Wainwright,14 the Supreme Court held that the Eighth
Amendment forbids the execution of an inmate who, although sane when
he" committed his crime and was sentenced to death, became
incompetent16 while on death row.' 7 The Court found the prohibition on
executing the insane had "impressive historical credentials." 8 Even the
dissent, authored by then-Justice Rehnquist, did not dispute the practice's
overwhelming historical opposition.' 9
In the Anglo-American tradition, the ban on executing the insane
has been recognized since at least the sixteenth century.20 One exception
came during the reign of Henry VIII. After Queen Katherine Howard
and Lady Jane Rochford were arrested for high treason, 21 Lady Rochford
suffered a mental breakdown and was deemed insane.22 To prevent the
Lady from escaping his wrath, King Henry promulgated a statute that
23
changed the process due to individuals who committed high treason.
14. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
15. This comment will only use male pronouns to refer to death row inmates because
3,174 of the 3,228 inmates on death row in 2006 were male, accounting for 98.3% of the
death row population. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Capital Punishment 2006, Table
12
(2007),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/html/cp/2006/tables/
cp06stl2.htm.
16. In his concurrence, Justice Powell found competence under the Eighth
Amendment requires the condemned know he is to be executed and why. See Ford,477
U.S. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring). Powell derived his standard from the consensus of
states at the time. Some courts have adopted his standard for incompetence to be
executed as a constitutional minimum. See, e.g., Johnson v. Cabana, 818 F.2d 333, 337
(5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1061 (1987).
The ABA has articulated a similar standard for incompetence to be executed, where
the condemned is deemed incompetent if he cannot understand the nature of the pending
proceedings, the crime he was convicted of, and the reason for his punishment, and if he
lacks the capacity to recognize a fact that may make his execution unlawful. A.B.A.
Criminal Justice Mental Health Standard 7-5.6.
17. See Wainwright, 477 U.S. at 410.
18. See id. at 407.
19. See id. at 435 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority's decision to
"constitutionalize" a rule that was already uniformly accepted).
20. See E. Coke, 3 Institutes 6 (6th ed. 1680) (noting executing the insane was
against the common law).
21.

See WEIR, ALISON, HENRY VIII: THE KING AND His COURT 445-50 (2001)

(describing Queen Katherine Howard's and Lady Rochford's arrest, interrogation, and
execution following the Queen's sexual indiscretions).
22. See id. at 447.
23. See An Acte for due Pces to be had in Highe Treason in Cases of Lunacye or
Madnes, 33 Hen. 8, c. 20 (1541-42), reprintedin 3 THE STATUTES OF THE REALM 855-57
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The statute permitted both the trial of an insane person who had
confessed when of sound mind and the execution of an individual who
had been tried when of sound mind and who subsequently became
insane.24 The statute, however, was not long-lived.2 5 King Philip and
Queen Mary, King Henry's daughter by Catherine of Aragon, restored
the common law prohibition on the execution of the insane.2 6 Sir
Edward Coke, Elizabeth I's Attorney General, celebrated the death of
King Henry's "cruell [sic] and inhuman law" because, even in the
sixteenth century, it violated the common law.27
However, while the historical opposition to executing the insane has
been overwhelming, the Court in Ford v. Wainwright acknowledged the
basis of this opposition has been varied.28 Blackstone explained the legal
opposition to executing the insane in procedural terms, noting in his
Commentaries:
[I]f a man in his sound memory commits a capital offence [sic], and
before arraignment for it, he becomes mad, he ought not to be
arraigned for it; because he is not able to plead to it with that advice
(Dawsons of Pall Mall London 1963); see also ALISON WEIR, Six WIVES OF HENRY VIII
481 (1991) (noting Henry ordered the passage of the act enabling the execution of the
insane because Lady Rochford was "in a frenzy" following her arrest and until her
execution).
24. See 33 Hen. 8, c. 20. The statute provided in relevant part:
[T]hat yf any pson or psons shall happen to be attainted and convicted of highe
treason, by auctoritie of Parliament or by the due course of the Comon lawes or
statuts of this Realme, and afterwards fall to madness or lunacye, that yet
nevertheless they shall have and suffer execucon, their madness or lunacye
notwithstandinge....
Id.
25. See An Acte wherby certayne Offences bee made Tresons; and also for the
Government of the Kinges and Quenes Majesties Issue, 1 & 2 Phil. & M., c. 10 § 6
(1554, 1554-5), reprintedin 4 THE STATUTES OF THE REALM 257 (Dawsons of Pall Mall
See also 4 WILLIAM
London 1963) (restoring the common law procedures).
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *25 (interpreting the statute as prohibiting the trial and
execution of the insane).
Notably, this was not the only treason statute passed during Henry VIII's reign that
was repealed by one of his children. To correct his father's extremes, Edward VI's
government repealed all acts and statutes concerning the definition of treason except the
treason statute of Edward III, Declaration what Offences shall be adjudged Treason, 25
Edw. 3, Stat. 5 c. 2 (1352), reprinted in 1 THE STATUTES OF THE REALM 319-20 (Dawsons
of Pall Mall London 1963). See An Acte for the Repeale of certaine Statutes concerninge
Treasons, Felonyes, &c, 1 Edw. 6, c. 12 (1547) reprinted in 4 THE STATUTES OF THE
REALM 18-22 (Dawsons of Pall Mall London 1963). The act even recognized that
Henry's treason statutes "might seme [sic]" to be "extreme and terrible." Id. at 18.
26. See 1 & 2 Phil. & M., c. 10, § 6. See also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *25 (interpreting the statute as prohibiting the trial and execution of the
insane). It is telling that a queen who would earn the appellation "Bloody Mary" rejected
executing the insane.
27. Coke, supra note 20, at 6.
28. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 407 (1986).
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and caution that he ought. And if, after he has pleaded, the prisoner
becomes mad, he shall not be tried: for how can he make his defence
[sic]? If, after he be tried and found guilty, he loses his senses before
judgment, judgment shall not be pronounced; and if, after judgment,
he becomes of nonsane [sic] memory, execution shall be stayed: for
peradventure, says the humanity of the English law, had the prisoner
been of sound memory, he might have alleged something in stay of
judgment or execution.29
Blackstone also argued the insane need not be punished at all under the
theory offuriosus solo furorepunitur, that is, "a madman is punished by
his madness alone." 30
Sir Edward Coke advanced two separate arguments against
executing the insane. He first argued against what he characterized as
the inhumane spectacle of executing a man who did not understand why
he was being executed.'
Coke also advanced an argument based on
deterrence, claiming that executing an insane prisoner could serve no
example to others.32
Modem scholars have rejected the execution of the insane based on,
among other arguments, retributive theory. These scholars argue killing
an insane person does not have the same "moral quality" as killing a sane
person.3 3 Therefore, because retribution requires a balancing of the
crime committed and punishment imposed, executing an insane person
would not satisfy the purpose of retribution. 34
Still others base their opposition to the execution of the insane on
religious grounds.3 5 These opponents note the condemned should have
an opportunity to prepare to meet his Creator, an endeavor in which an
insane individual could not be expected to succeed.36 This argument has

29. 4

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24-25 (citing 1 Hal. P.C. 34).
30. See Wainwright, 477 U.S. at 407 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *388-89). The theory has been cited repeatedly by both state and federal
courts; however, none of these courts explain why this justification, which has no
apparent grounding in theories of punishment, is sufficient to stay an execution. See, e.g.,
Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 19 (1950); Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 305 A.2d 890,
893 n.6 (Pa. 1973); State v. Cook, 244 A.2d 833, 835 (R.I. 1968).
31. Coke, supra note 20, at 6.
32. Id.
33. See Geoffrey Hazard & David Louisell, Death, the State, and the Insane: Stay of
Execution, 9 UCLA L. REv. 381, 387 (1962).
34. See id. at 386-87.
35. See id. at 387 (citing Sir John Hawles, Remarks on the Trial of M. Charles
Bateman, 11 How. ST. T. 474, 477 (Howell ed. 1816)(1685)).
36. See id; see also THE CATHOLIC'S COMPANION 247 (1882), available at
http://www.archive.org/details/MN5114ucmf 6 (urging those near death to "often cry to
God for mercy, and make frequent acts of contrition").
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also been stated in secular terms under the guise of allowing the prisoner
to prepare mentally, if not necessarily spiritually, for his death.
B.

Forced Medication ofa Non-ConsentingInmate

Modem anti-psychotic drugs have the potential to moot many of the
objections to the execution of the mentally ill by rendering the inmate
competent, at least to some degree, prior to execution.38 An inmate's
medically induced sanity can answer Blackstone's concerns regarding
the inmate's ability to assist in his defense or divulge potentially
exculpating information.3 9 Concerns regarding an inmate's inability to
prepare to meet his Maker or the spectacle of killing a man who does not
understand why he is dying likewise can be assuaged by the inmate's
sanity at the moment of execution. 40 Retributive objections would also
be eliminated by ensuring that the execution has a sufficient "quality" to
balance the two acts. 4 1 To that end, some states have sought to forcibly
medicate inmates with anti-psychotic drugs to impose sanity upon them
for the purpose of subsequently executing them.4 2
However, the Supreme Court has placed some limitations on the use
of these medicines.4 3 Within the penological context,4 three principal
cases establish the framework for determining when anti-psychotic
46
medication may be forcibly administered 45: Washington v. Harper,
48
47
Riggins v. Nevada, and Sell v. United States.
37. See Wainwright, 477 U.S. at 421 (Powell, J., concurring).
38. See United States v. Thrasher, 503 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1252 (W.D. Mo. 2007)
(finding approximately 75% to 80% of defendants and 75% to 80% of 4241(d) patients
have been restored to competency in the federal prisons system after being forcibly
medicated); see also Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 2003) (vacating Charles
Singleton's stay of execution after forced medication restored his competence).
39. See, e.g., Thrasher, 503 F. Supp. 2d at 1252 (forced medication necessary to
clear up defendant's disorganized thinking and make him responsive to counsel).
40. See, e.g., Traci Shurley, Singleton Dies; Appeal Stops 2nd Execution, ARKANSAS
DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Jan. 7, 2004, at 11 (reporting on Charles Singleton's execution and
noting Singleton's attorney observed Singleton was "saner" and more rational since he
had been forcibly medicated than at any point since the attorney had known him).
41. See Hazard & Louisell, supra note 33, at 387.
42. See, e.g., Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 2003); State v. Perry, 610
So. 2d 746 (La. 1992); Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d 53, 62 (S.C. 1993).
43. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127,
136 (1992); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
44. For cases outside the penological context, see, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990) (holding the Due Process clause protects an individual
interest to refuse life-sustaining treatment).
45. See generally United States v. Gonzalez-Aguilar, 446 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1101-04
(D. Ariz. 2006) (summarizing the state of the law in cases involving the forced
medication of detainees).
46. Harper,494 U.S. 210.
47. Riggins, 504 U.S. 127.
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In Washington v. Harper,the Supreme Court heard a challenge to a
Washington state prison regulation permitting the state to forcibly
administer anti-psychotic drugs to inmates who suffered from a mental
disorder and were a danger to themselves or others. 4 9 The Court
recognized a significant liberty interest in avoiding forced medication
with anti-psychotic drugs.50 However, because the forced medication
took place within a prison, the Court held the proper standard of review
was not strict scrutiny.s" Instead, the Court evaluated the regulation by
asking whether it was "reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests."52
When evaluating the reasonableness of a regulation the Court
considers whether there is a valid connection between the regulation and
a legitimate government interest; the impact of accommodating the
inmate's asserted constitutional right; and the absence of ready
alternatives.53 Applying this standard, in Harper the Court found the
state is permitted to forcibly administer anti-psychotic drugs to an inmate
who is a danger to himself or others if the treatment is in the inmate's
medical interest. 54
Some courts have held that Harperonly permits forced medication
of an inmate when he is a danger to himself or others.5 However, the
Harper Court only cited "danger" as one possible justification, not the
only justification for forced medication.56 The Court held forced
medication is permissible whenever the treatment is in the inmate's
48. Sell, 539 U.S. 166.
49. Harper,494 U.S. at 215.
50. Id. at 221-22. The dissent in Washington v. Harperwent further, describing the
use of anti-psychotic drugs on non-consenting inmates as constituting "a deprivation of
liberty in the most literal and fundamental sense." Id. at 238 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
51. See id. at 218 (rejecting the Washington Supreme Court's imposition of a strict
scrutiny standard).
52. Id. at 223 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (holding the
reasonableness standard applied in a case where prison regulations imposed restrictions
on the fundamental right to marry)).
53. Harper,494 U.S. at 224-25 (citing Turner,482 U.S. at 89-91)).
54. See Harper,494 U.S. at 227.
55. See, e.g., State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 753 (La. 1992); Singleton v. State, 437
S.E.2d 53, 60 (S.C. 1993); see also, Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1035 (8th Cir.
2003) (Heaney, J., dissenting). These cases emphasize Harper's grant of authority to
forcibly medicate in cases where a prisoner is a danger to himself or others is a
requirement in all forced medication cases. These courts did not have the benefit of Sell
v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003), in rendering their decisions. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, in a case five years after the Sell decision, argued Sell was not a
departure from prior case law, noting Harperand Rigins made clear inmate safety was
only one possible "overriding justification" or "essential state policy." Commonwealth v.
Sam, 952 A.2d 565, 573 n.1 1 (Pa. 2008).
56. See, e.g., Sell, 539 U.S. at 179 (finding Harper and Riggins permit forced
medication of defendant facing serious charges even without a finding of dangerousness).
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medical interest and there is an overriding justification for the
administration of the anti-psychotic drugs.
The Court did not explicitly define "overriding justification."
However, in Riggins v. Nevada5 8 the Court indicated the need to
adjudicate guilt or innocence of a serious crime may constitute an
overriding justification 9 even absent a finding of dangerousness.60 The
Court reasoned that because the need to adjudicate guilt and innocence is
necessary to ensure ordered liberty61 this interest likely satisfies Harper's
second prong.62
The suggestion in Riggins that adjudication of guilt and innocence
constituted an overriding justification was formally adopted in Sell v.
United States.6 3 Emphasizing that such cases "may be rare," the Court
developed a four-part test to decide when a state interest was sufficiently
important to justify forced medication.6 The Sell test requires:
1. An important government interest be at stake;
2. The proposed treatment be substantially likely to render the
defendant competent and be substantially unlikely to
undermine the fairness of the proceedings;
3. Less intrusive alternatives be unlikely to achieve the same
results; and
4.

The administration of drugs be medically appropriate.65

This test is not appropriate, however, to evaluate all state interests.
The Sell test did not replace Harper.66 The Court emphasized the test
was developed to resolve only the specific question of whether rendering
the defendant competent to stand trial, absent a finding of dangerousness,
57. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 224-25 (reasonableness test requires showing of a
legitimate government interest); see also Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135 (characterizing
"legitimate government interest" in Harperas an "overriding" interest).
58. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135-36.
59. Id. In Riggins, the Court evaluated Nevada's right to forcibly medicate an
individual for the purposes of rendering him competent to stand trial. Id. at 132-33.
Because the trial court did not explain why it granted the state's motion to medicate the
defendant, the Court found Nevada had violated the defendant's rights. Id. at 136-37.
60. See id. at 135-36.
61. Id. (citing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 347 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
62. Id.
63. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 180-81.
66. Id. at 181-82.
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constituted an overriding justification.67 Nor is Sell applicable when the
inmate's interests, as opposed to government interests, are at stake. 68 For
example, Sell does not apply when the refusal to accept treatment places
the inmate's health at grave risk.69
C.

ForcedMedication to Render Inmate Competent to Execute

Reconciling the prohibition on executing the insane with the ability
to reestablish competence through the forced administration of antipsychotic medication has produced inconsistent results.70 The two state
supreme courts that have confronted the issue, 7 ' Louisiana's in State v.
Perry72 and South Carolina's in Singleton v. State,73 ruled forced
medication was unconstitutional on state constitutional grounds.74 The
Eighth Circuit, however, in Singleton v. Norris,75 upheld the practice
76
based on the United States Constitution.
1.

The Inmate's Medical Interest

Perhaps the most complicated factor in addressing this issue is
satisfying the first prong of the Harpertest: that the treatment be in the
inmate's best medical interest. 77 Arguments that forced medication
cannot be in the condemned's medical interest generally take two forms.
The first argument, adopted by the court in Perry, is that treatment
can never be in the condemned's medical interest because the direct
result of medicating him will be death by execution.
Such treatment,
according to the court, cannot be reconciled with the Hippocratic Oath,
which requires doctors only prescribe medicine for the good of their
patients, never give advice that may cause death, and segregate
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181-82 (2003).
70. See, e.g., Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 2003); State v. Perry, 610
So. 2d 746 (La. 1992).
71. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was presented with a case in which a trial
court ordered that a schizophrenic death row inmate be forcibly medicated to render him
competent to execute, but it dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. See Staley v. State, 233
S.W.3d 337, 338 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (dismissing appeal because the order was not
subject to appeal).
72. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746.
73. Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d 53 (S.C. 1993).
74. See Perry, 610 So. 2d at 755; Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d at 62.
75. Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018.
76. See id. at 1023-24.
77. See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992) (explaining Harper requires
treatment be in the inmate's medical interest and there be an overriding justification for
the government action).
78. See Perry, 610 So. 2d at 752.
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themselves from any intentional ill-doing.7 9 The Perry Court found this
ethical conflict significant because it may prevent a physician from
administering medicine that an inmate needs to relieve the suffering of a
mental illness in the hope of avoiding complicity in an execution.80
The second argument, adopted by the dissent in Norris, claims druginduced sanity does not rise to the level of "true sanity."81 Instead, the
Norris dissent contended the drugs only hide the external symptoms of
insanity, while the patient remains insane in fact.82
Subsequent cases, however, appear to foreclose both of these
arguments regarding medical appropriateness. The Supreme Court has
defined "medically appropriate" as the patient's best medical interest in
light of his medical condition.83 This definition requires reviewing
courts to examine the side effects and potential benefits of treatment. 84
There is nothing in the Court's opinion suggesting a third party's
reaction to treatment should be considered.
The courts have generally accepted this narrow interpretation of the
requirement. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
has explicitly held that "medically appropriate" excludes any
consideration of a pending date of execution.
Other circuits have
similarly limited their consideration of medical appropriateness to
weighing probable medical benefits and side effects directly flowing
from potential courses of treatment. 86 To that end, evaluating a
treatment's medical appropriateness appears to require only the

79.

Id. (citing Hippocratic

Oath, STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 647 (4th

Unabridged Lawyer's ed. 1976)).
80. Id.
81. See Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1034 (8th Cir. 2003) (Heaney, J.,
dissenting) (basing this opinion on frequent changes in Singleton's treatment and the fact
that no treatment had ever kept him consistently symptom-free).
82. Id.
83. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181 (2003).
84. See id. (noting that, given the varying side effects and success rates, the medical
interest factor should be considered in light of the specific drug prescribed).
85. See Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d at 1026 (holding that a medication regime that
is permissible absent a pending execution date is similarly permissible if the patient is
facing capital punishment).
86. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 532 F.3d 538, 558 (6th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 242 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Bradley, 417 F.3d
1107, 1115 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 876-77 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (approving the district court measuring medical appropriateness of medication by
examining the capacity to alleviate schizophrenia against capacity to produce harm);
United States v. McCray, 474 F. Supp. 2d 671, 682 (D.N.J. 2007); United States v.
Gomes, 305 F. Supp. 2d 158, 168 (D. Conn. 2004).
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consideration of the treatment's impact on the patient's disease and not
potential indirect consequences of a proposed course of treatment.
The second argument, questioning whether drug-induced sanity is
"true sanity,"88 is also misguided. Competence to execute requires only
that the inmate be aware of the punishment he is about to receive and
understand why he is going to receive it. 89 The Supreme Court does not
require rationality or perfect sanity. 90
In fact, the Court has
acknowledged that a man who was "out of touch with reality" could be
executed. 91 Even if the inmate's symptoms are "masked," provided the
medication allows him to understand that he has been sentenced to death
and why, he is sufficiently sane to be executed.92
2.

Government Interest in Medication

The issue of whether the government interest in carrying out the
death sentence is sufficiently important to justify forced medication has
also created disagreement.93 In the absence of a guilty man going free, as
was at stake in Riggins and Sell, or the inmate endangering himself or
others, as was at stake in Harper,the only argument available to the state
is an interest in the execution itself.94 This interest is not insubstantial.
The Supreme Court has recognized a compelling societal interest in
punishing those who violate the law.96
In cases where capital
punishment is imposed, courts have held this interest is especially
significant.9 7

87. See Weston, 255 F.3d at 876-77 (approving the district court measuring medical
appropriateness of medication by examining the capacity to alleviate schizophrenia
against capacity to produce harm).
88. See, e.g., Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d at 1034 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
89. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 417 (1986); see also Panetti v.
Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2861-62 (2007) (suggesting some inquiry into whether the
inmate recognizes the severity of his crime and the objective of the community in
executing him is appropriate).
90. See Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2862 (2007) (holding competence to execute does not
require the inmate be "normal" or "rational" in a lay sense of those terms).
91. Id.
92. Wainwright,477 U.S. at 417 (1986).
93. See, e.g., Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d at 1025 (finding state's "essential
interest" in carrying out sentence greatest in capital cases); State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746,
761 (La. 1992) (concluding execution of a prisoner with chemically-induced competence
cannot further the societal goals to be advanced by the death penalty).
94. See, e.g., Perry, 610 So. 2d at 761 (outlining the state's argument in favor of
forced medication).
95. See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 172 (2001) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475
U.S. 412, 426 (1986)) (acknowledging a compelling interest in convicting and punishing
criminals).
96. See id.
97. See Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d at 1025.
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In spite of the recognized state interest in carrying out lawfully
imposed sentences, the court in Perry held that forced medication does
not further society's interest in imposing the death penalty. 98 The court
noted the basic assumption of deterrence is that a potential criminal will
engage in a cost-benefit analysis that considers available punishments
prior to committing a crime. 99 However, according to the court, it is
unlikely that a prohibition on executing the insane would enter into the
individual's cost-benefit analysis.' 00 This is because few individuals
anticipate their own future insanity.' 0
The Perry court also rejected a retributive argument for forced
medication.10 2 Because modem retributive theory is concerned with
proportionality and respect for human dignity, both of the victim and
offender, the court found that forced medication prior to execution was
inconsistent with a goal of retribution. 03 To that end, the court held that
administering a lethal dose of medication to kill an inmate was a
proportionate punishment that does not degrade his human dignity.10 4
However, the court further held medicating the same inmate to manage
his mental illness causes any subsequent execution to become
disproportionate and degrading. 0 5
Other jurists claim the state's interest in executing the inmate is
diminished precisely because the inmate has been sentenced to death. 0 6
That is, as a result of the death sentence, the inmate has no opportunity to
be freed short of pardon, commutation, or exoneration, even if the
98. See Perry, 610 So. 2d at 766 (finding deterrence and retribution are not achieved
by executing an inmate whose competence has been restored by forced medication).
99. See id. at 766-67. Whether criminals actually engage in such behavior is a
subject of much debate, which is beyond the scope of this comment. For a discussion of
these issues, see, e.g., William L. Barnes, Revenge on Utilitarianism:Renouncing a
Comprehensive Economic Theory of Crime and Punishment, 74 IND. L.J. 627 (1999)
(arguing the utility of an economic analysis of crime and punishment varies depending on
the crime); Gary Becker, Crime andPunishment: An Economic Approach, J. POL. ECON.,
169 (1968) (considering among other things the effect of severity and certainty of
punishment on actors).
100. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 766-67.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 767 (citing H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 10 (1968);
J.G. MURPHY, RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 227 (1979)).
103. See id.
104. See id. at 767-68 (La. 1992) (citing H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY 233-34 (1968); IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 198 (W.
Hastie trans. 1887)).
105. See id. It is unclear to this author how the court reconciled these two
propositions.
106. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sam, 952 A.2d 565, 592 (Pa. 2008) (Baer, J.,
dissenting) (finding the government interest in protecting the public and in preserving
evidence is "drastically" less important where an individual has already been convicted
and sentenced than when an individual is awaiting trial).
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sentence is not carried out. Therefore, medication is not needed to
protect society from a murderer. Moreover, after the death sentence has
been imposed and direct appeals completed, there is no need for concern
regarding a potential loss of evidence.107 Nor is there any risk of a guilty
man escaping a verdict. 08
In the absence of such extenuating
circumstances, it is argued the state's interest in carrying out a particular
punishment cannot justify the invasion of the inmate's well-recognized
privacy interest.' 09
To accept this argument, one must believe the punishments of death
and life in prison are so similar as to permit a mandated commutation of
an insane inmate's death sentence. However, the Supreme Court has
recognized a "qualitative difference" between the sentences of death and
life in prison.1 0 While life in prison is a significant punishment, in
capital cases the state deemed execution the appropriate response to a
particularly heinous crime, and a judge or jury found capital punishment
necessary given the particular facts."' The Court has honored these
determinations by holding that for some crimes the only punishment that
can adequately meet society's right of proportionate punishment is the
sentence of death.' 12 Moreover, recognizing the unique nature of the
death penalty, the Court has imposed greater procedural safeguards for
the death penalty than for other punishments. 13
107. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003) (noting government has a
substantial interest in timely prosecution, at least in part, because there is a risk that
evidence will be lost over time).
108. See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135-36 (1992) (acknowledging the need to
adjudicate guilt and innocence).
109. See, e.g., Sam, 952 A.2d at 592 (Baer, J., dissenting).
110. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring)
("The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree
but in kind."). See also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
announcing the judgment of the Court and writing for himself and Chief Justice
Rehnquist) ("death is different").
S11l.Under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002), the determination of whether
the necessary aggravating factors to impose the death penalty are present is the sole
province of the jury acting as fact finder. However, some states continue to allow a judge
to determine the sentence after the jury has made findings regarding mitigating and
aggravating factors. See, e.g., R.R.S. Neb. § 29-2520(h) (three judge panel determines
whether to impose sentence of death or life in prison); Mont. Code § 46-18-305 (court
decides sentence after trier of fact finds aggravating circumstances).
112. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184 (1976) (acknowledging society views
certain crimes as so grievous that the only adequate response is the imposition of the
death penalty). See also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2659 (2008) (outlawing
death penalty for child rape, but recognizing the death penalty may be imposed for crimes
against the state or crimes against the individual where a life was taken).
113. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 856 (1988) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (noting the Court has consistently imposed unique substantive and procedural
safeguards prior to imposing a sentence of death); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 994 (Scalia, J.,
announcing the judgment of the Court and writing for himself and Chief Justice
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III. SAM AND WATSON

In 2008, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided two cases
concerning the forced medication of a death row inmate to render him
competent to determine whether he wished to pursue a collateral appeal
via the PCRA. 114 Although there is a high incidence of mental illness in
America's death row population," 5 and these two cases arose from
orders issued in the same city within one year of each other,'1 6 it appears
no other court of last resort has considered this question on either the
state or federal level.
The majority in both Sam and Watson (hereinafter "the majority")117
conducted a Sell-type analysis to determine whether forced medication
was permissible." 8 It found that the government interest prong' 19 was
satisfied by society's interest in achieving finality in criminal
proceedings and the inmates' interest in controlling the course of their
appeals.12 0 Relying on the inmates' doctor, the court concluded that the
second' 2 1 and fourth1 2 2 prongs were satisfied because the treatment was
substantially likely to render both men competent 23 and the treatment
was medically appropriate.1 24 The majority further found that the third
Sell factor 2 5 was satisfied because forced medication was the only means

Rehnquist) (noting protections have been imposed for the death penalty that are not
provided in other criminal matters; for example, proportionality review was available for
death penalty cases but not life in prison without parole)
114. See Commonwealth v. Watson, 952 A.2d 541 (Pa. 2008); Commonwealth v.
Sam, 952 A.2d 565 (Pa. 2008).
115. The available literature varies widely with estimates of mentally ill death row
inmates ranging from 10%, see Cantor, supra note 2, at 136, to as high as 70% in some
clinical studies, see Kane, supra note 4, at 150.
116. Watson was an appeal of an order entered on November 22, 2004, in the
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, Watson, 952 A.2d at 541, while Sam was an appeal
from an order entered on October 20, 2005 in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas,
Sam, 952 A.2d at 565.
117. Chief Justice Castille wrote both opinions, and the members of the majority in
each case were identical (although Justice J. Michael Eakin also wrote a separate
concurrence in Sam). See Sam, 952 A.2d 565; Watson, 952 A.2d 541.
118. See Watson, 952 A.2d at 555-56; Sam, 952 A.2d at 575 (finding Sell inapplicable
but "tracking" their opinions to Sell because all parties assumed it applied).
119. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003) (requiring an "important
government interest" be at stake) (emphasis in original).
120. See Watson, 952 A.2d at 560; Sam, 952 A.2d at 588.
121. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 181 (requiring involuntary medication "significantly
further" the state's interest) (emphasis in original).
122. See id. (requiring administration of drugs be "medically appropriate")(emphasis
in original).
123. See Watson, 952 A.2d at 558-59; Sam, 952 A.2d at 579-81.
124. Watson, 952 A.2d at 560-61; Sam, 952 A.2d at 582-83.
125. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 181 (requiring the medication be "necessary" to further
state's interest) (emphasis in original).
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by which the inmates' competence could be restored. 2 6 Under the
PCRA, failure to seek collateral relief constitutes a waiver of the right,
even if the failure to pursue relief is not knowing or voluntary.127
Without restoration of competence, the inmates' incompetent decision
not to pursue collateral relief would have been binding. 12 8 Therefore, the
majority held society's interest in finality and the inmates' autonomy
interest could not be satisfied without medicating them.129
The dissent in Watson argued that appointing a "next friend" would
have been a less intrusive means of allowing the inmate to pursue a
PCRA claim. 130 The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the right of a
"next friend," who is dedicated to the best interests of a party, to proceed
on that party's behalf if the party is unable to appear on his own behalf
due to inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disability. 131 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has also previously recognized next friend
standing in a case where a prisoner's mental incompetence barred
effective collateral review in a death penalty case. 13 2
However, the majority in Watson rejected the next friend as an
acceptable alternative. 13 3 It held that rendering the inmate competent is a
more effective means of achieving the Commonwealth's finality interest
and protecting the inmate's autonomy interest.134 The majority observed
that the next friend doctrine would violate Watson's autonomy because it

126. See Watson, 952 A.2d at 559-60; Sam, 952 A.2d at 582.
127. See Sam, 952 A.2d at 578.
128. See Watson, 952 A.2d at 555; Sam, 952 A.2d at 578 (holding if Sam were not
rendered competent his petition would likely be time barred and the Governor would be
required to issue a warrant of execution).
129. See Watson, 952 A.2d at 559-60; Sam, 952 A.2d at 588.
130. See Watson, 952 A.2d at 564-65 (Baer, J., dissenting). Justice Baer argued in
favor of a next friend in Watson because a next friend (Watson's mother) was available.
Id. at 564 (Baer, J., dissenting). Sam, however, did not have a next friend readily
available, in part because he killed the individuals who would traditionally serve as his
next friend. Sam, 952 A.2d at 578; id. at 589 (Baer, J., dissenting).
131. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163-64 (1990).
132. See Commonwealth v. Haag, 809 A.2d 271, 278 (Pa. 2002). In Haag, the court
noted a number of other jurisdictions allowed third parties to proceed on an inmate's
behalf (although they were not necessarily referred to as "next friends"), see, e.g., Debra
A.E., 523 N.W.2d at 734; Dugar v. Whitley, 615 So. 2d 1334, 1335 (La. 1993); Fisher v.
State, 1992 OK CR 79, 845 P.2d 1272, 1277 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992), cert. denied, 509
U.S. 911, 125 L. Ed. 2d 704, 113 S. Ct. 3014 (1993); Exparte Mines, 26 S.W.3d 910,
911 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 908, 149 L. Ed. 2d 143, 121 S. Ct.
1234 (2001). The court further noted that even those courts that did not permit postconviction action to proceed in the absence of the inmate's competence allowed third
parties to pursue legal and record-based claims on the inmate's behalf. See Carter v.
State, 706 So. 2d 873, 876 (Fla. 1998) (per curiam); People v. Owens, 139 Ill. 2d 351,
564 N.E.2d 1184, 1190 (111. 1990).
133. Watson, 952 A.2d at 560.
134. See id.
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could result in appeals proceeding that he did not wish to pursue. 3 ' The
court also found that finality would not be adequately achieved if a next
friend were employed for Watson because if Watson regained
competence after his next friend completed the collateral appeal, Watson
would likely seek to litigate additional claims.' 36 Therefore, in the
absence of a superior alternative, the majority concluded that forcibly
medicating Sam and Watson would satisfy the Sell test.'37
Although the majority evaluated Sam and Watson using Sell, it
found Sell inapplicable.1 38 The majority observed that the Sell test only
applies to cases where the purpose of the medication is rendering a
detainee competent to stand trial.139 Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme
Court explicitly held Sell was not appropriate in cases where the purpose
of medication was solely to further the inmate's interests. 140 The
majority held that the appeals afforded by the PCRA met this "caveat" to
the Sell rule.141 The only purpose of the PCRA process is to provide a
convict a second chance to seek exoneration or the evaluation of claims
that could result in a reduced sentence or a new trial.14 2 An inmate
pursuing a PCRA appeal cannot suffer any additional penalty.14 3
Because the PCRA process was intended to benefit the inmate the court
reasoned that the Commonwealth could have satisfied its burden without
meeting the criteria outlined in Sell.'"
This benefit to the inmate also served to distinguish Sam and
45
Watson from Singleton v. State and Perry.1
In Sam and Watson the
Commonwealth's interest was not "limited to facilitating execution of a
judgment of death," 46 as it was in Singleton v. State and Perry.147 As
135. See Watson, 952 A.2d at 553 (observing Watson expressed a desire to be
executed).
136. See Watson, 952 A.2d at 557-58 (noting litigation via a next friend may serve as
"little more than a dress rehearsal for a future PCRA proceeding" because Watson's
attorney had already sought assurance that future litigation would not be foreclosed if
Watson regained competence).
137. See Watson, 952 A.2d at 561, Sam, 952 A.2d at 583.
138. See Watson, 952 A.2d at 555; Sam, 952 A.2d at 574-75 (holding that because the
purpose of medication is to further the inmate's interests, the "Sell caveat" applies, and
Sell is therefore inapplicable).
139. See Watson, 952 A.2d at 555; Sam, 952 A.2d at 574-75.
140. See Watson, 952 A.2d at 555; Sam 952 A.2d at 574-75; see also Sell v. United
States, 539 U.S. 166, 181-82 (2003).
141. See Watson, 952 A.2d at 555; Sam 952 A.2d at 574-75 (calling the PCRA system
a "failsafe" with the sole purpose of vindicating the inmate's interests).
142. See Watson, 952 A.2d at 555; Sam, 952 A.2d at 574-75.
143. See Watson, 952 A.2d at 555; Sam, 952 A.2d at 574-75.
144. See Watson, 952 A.2d at 555; Sam, 952 A.2d at 575.
145. Sam, 952 A.2d at 587.
146. Id.
147. State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 752 (La. 1992); Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d 53,
61 (S.C. 1993).
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such, the majority held Sam and Watson were more analogous to a New
Hampshire case in which the New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld a
court order to force-feed a prisoner to further his medical interest. 148

IV.

ANALYSIS OF SAM AND WATSON

This section will evaluate the Sam and Watson decisions in light of
the Supreme Court's decisions in Harper,149 Riggins,so and Sell."' Part
A will consider the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's determination that
Sell did not apply to Sam and Watson. And Part B will reevaluate Sam
and Watson by conducting a Harper analysis, which was lacking from
the Sam and Watson decisions.
A.

Determining Whether Sell Controls

In Commonwealth v. Sam and Commonwealth v. Watson, all parties
assumed the test articulated in Sell should be used to determine whether
the Commonwealth could medicate the inmates.152 Similarly, the court
in Singleton v. Norris applied a Sell-type test to determine whether the
state could medicate an inmate to render him competent to execute. 53
However, as the Sam and Watson majority noted,154 the Sell test has a
limited purpose. 5 Sell was developed only to determine whether the
involuntary administration of anti-psychotic drugs is permitted to render
a defendant competent to stand trial. 5 6
Collateral appeals implicate vastly different rights and protections
than the trial rights Sell was designed to protect.' 57 The state must meet a
significantly higher burden before it can justify compromising the rights

148. Id. at 588 (citing In re Caulk, 480 A.2d 93 (N.H. 1984)).
149. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
150. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
151. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
152. See Commonwealth v. Watson, 952 A.2d 541, 555-56 (Pa. 2008); Sam, 952 A.2d
at 575.
153. Sell had not yet been decided at the United States Supreme Court; however, the
Eighth Circuit based its test on the standard it articulated when the court heard Sell's
prior appeal. See Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1024 (8th Cir. 2003). This test
adds the "no less intrusive alternatives" requirement to the Harper analysis and is
substantially similar to the test articulated by the Supreme Court in Sell's subsequent
appeal. Id.
154. See Watson, 952 A.2d at 555; Sam, 952 A.2d at 575.
155. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 181 (emphasizing the test is applicable only to the specific
facts at issue, i.e., rendering a defendant competent to stand trial).
156. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 181.
157. See id. at 181-82 ("We emphasize that the court applying these standards is
seeking to determine whether involuntary administration of drugs is necessary
significantly to further a particular governmental interest, namely the interest in rendering
the defendant competent to stand trial.") (emphasis in original).
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of a criminal defendant than it must meet for a prison inmate."' This is
because an inmate pursuing a collateral appeal has been tried, convicted,
sentenced, and has completed his direct appeal.1 59 As a result, the Court
has upheld pervasive restrictions on inmates' rights including the right to
association, 160 the right to communicate,161 the right to receive
correspondence,' 62 and the right to free exercise of religion.' 63
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that many states permit collateral appeals
to proceed even if the petitioner becomes incompetent after filing
them. '6

In addition, the Court in Sell explicitly noted its test would be
inapplicable in cases where medication was sought to further the
inmate's own medical interests. 16 5 While a trial is usually not in a
defendant's interest, an inmate has a vital interest in pursuing a collateral
appeal.166 If a trial cannot proceed, the defendant invariably benefits
because at trial the defendant can only shield his rights and liberties from
the power of the state. 67 During the collateral appeal, however, the roles
are reversed and the inmate wields a sword to attack his incarceration. 16 8
The courts are not empowered to place the inmate in a worse position
after the appeal than before.16 9 The only possible consequences for the
inmate on a collateral appeal are winning freedom, a reduced sentence, a
new trial, or preservation of the status quo.170
B.

HarperAnalysis

Because Sell is inapplicable, forcibly medicating a death row inmate
to determine if he wishes to seek collateral relief must be evaluated using

158. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995) (recognizing the "necessary"
limitation of many constitutional privileges and rights for prison inmates).
159. See, e.g., 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(3) (2008) (permitting collateral appeals only
after the conclusion of direct review, including review at the Pennsylvania and U.S.
Supreme Courts, or at the expiration of time for review).
160. See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131-32 (2003).
161. See Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 225 (2001).
162. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413 (1989).
163. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 351 (1987).
164. See Council v. Catoe, 597 S.E.2d 782, 787 (S.C. 2004) (adopting Wisconsin rule
that "default rule" is that post conviction relief hearings must proceed even if petitioner is
incompetent).
165. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181-82 (2003).
166. See Commonwealth v. Sam, 952 A.2d 565, 574-75 (Pa. 2008) (PCRA is
"exclusively" for benefit of convict).
167. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555-56 (1987).
168. See id.
169. See Sam, 952 A.2d at 574-75.
170. See, e.g., id. (noting the PCRA exclusively serves to provide opportunity to seek
new trial, lesser sentence or conviction, or exoneration).
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the two-prong test from Harper and Riggins.171 This test requires that
the treatment be in the inmate's medical interest and that the state have
an overriding justification for the proposed treatment.172
1.

Harper'sMedical Interest Requirement

To forcibly medicate an inmate under Harper,the state must first
establish the treatment is in his medical interest.'17 This is a fact-specific
inquiry that will vary depending on the type of mental illness and
proposed course of treatment.174 To that end, this comment will not
attempt to determine whether forced medication is always in the inmate's
medical interest.17 ' Rather, it will attempt to disprove the contention that
forced medication in this context is never in the inmate's medical
interest.
Commentators have rejected the medicate-to-execute regime upheld
in Singleton v. Norris,176 arguing that medicating an individual to execute
him can never be in his best medical interests because the end result is
death. 7 7 An inmate pursuing his collateral appeal, however, is in a
different position than an inmate whose execution date is imminent. The
collateral appeals process is one step removed from an execution.
Therefore, a doctor could conceivably medicate an inmate for his
collateral appeals and then stop medication prior to the execution date if
those appeals fail.
More fundamentally, however, the argument that Singleton v.
Norris's medicate-to-execute scheme is opposed to the patient's medical
interest relies on an inappropriately broad definition of medical interest.
Medical interest has been narrowly defined as the direct effects of the

171. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 178 (2003) (explaining Harper and
Riggins provide the framework for determining questions of forced medication in the
penological context).
172. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224-25 (1990); Riggins v. Nevada, 504
U.S. 127, 135 (1992).
173. See Harper,494 U.S. at 224-25; Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135.
174. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 181 (observing different types of drugs may have varying
levels of success and side effects).
175. See Harper,494 U.S. at 230 n.12 (noting all agree drugs are not appropriate in
all circumstances, but finding them appropriate in some).
176. See Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1026 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding
medication regime does not become inappropriate because an execution date has been
set).
177. See, e.g., Am. Med. Ass'n Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, Formal Op.
2.06: Capital Punishment, in CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS WITH
ANNOTATIONS 13, 14 (1998-1999 ed.) (1980) (AMA regulations stating doctors should
refrain from restoring death row inmate's competence).
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treatment.1 78 The courts do not consider any potential future legal
consequences of medical treatment.179
This limited definition of medical interest is appropriate. Doctors
are equipped to judge the medical effects of a given course of
treatment.180 However, doctors are not trained to competently speculate
about a state's political and legal response to medical treatment. 8 1
Political and legal forces have led to dramatic and sudden changes in the
death penalty laws, at times abolishing the practice altogether.182
Exonerating evidence may be found prior to the execution date. 83 A
pardon or commutation could be issued.18 4 Significantly, individuals
were more likely to be removed from death row in 2006 than to be
executed.185 Doctors cannot be expected to include these legal and
political issues within their area of expertise. Depriving an inmate of
sanity based on amateur speculation that he will be executed at some
future date surely cannot be in the inmate's medical interest.
When viewed in the proper scope, it cannot plausibly be argued that
forced medication is never in the medical interest of an inmate who is
pursuing a collateral appeal. At least some inmates' medical condition

178. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 532 F.3d 538, 558 (6th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 242 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Bradley, 417 F.3d
1107, 1115 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 876-77 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (approving the district court measuring medical appropriateness of medication by
examining its capacity to alleviate schizophrenia against its capacity to produce harm);
United States v. McCray, 474 F. Supp. 2d 671, 682 (D.N.J. 2007); United States v.
Gomes, 305 F. Supp. 2d 158, 168 (D. Conn. 2004).
179. See id.
180. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 230 n.12 (noting doctors who have full-time
responsibility for treating mentally ill inmates have requisite knowledge and expertise to
determine whether drugs should be used in an individual case).
181. See, e.g., Johns Hopkins School of Medicine Academic Catalog 2007-08,
available
at
http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/som/students/academics/catalog/
mcat07_08/MCAT2b.pdf (requiring instruction in "human structure and function,"
"Pathology and Human Pathophysiology," "organ systems," "ambulatory medicine," etc.,
but not in political science, criminal law, or post-conviction appeals).
182. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1976) (imposing a federal
moratorium on the death penalty); Tim Craig, Va. Executions are Put on Hold, THE
WASHINGTON PosT, Apr. 2, 2008, at B01 (reporting on death penalty moratorium in
Virginia); Keith B. Richburg, NJ. Approves Abolition of Death Penalty; Corzine to Sign,
THE WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 14, 2007, at A03 (reporting on abolition of death penalty in
New Jersey); Dirk Johnson, Illinois, Citing Faulty Verdicts, Bars Executions, N.Y.
TIMES, February 1, 2000, at Al (reporting on death penalty moratorium in Illinois).
183. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 1 (Finding in 2006 sixty individuals
left death row without being executed. In addition to those individuals, sixteen inmates
died of natural causes and three committed suicide. By contrast only 53 death row
inmates were actually executed.).
184. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. I (granting the president the power of
pardon and reprieve).
185. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 1.
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will improve. 186 Even if one accepts the overly broad definition of
medical interest that considers the indirect consequences of medical
treatment, the only possible results of a collateral appeal are neutral or
positive. If the collateral appeals fail, there is still no guarantee that there
will be an execution.187 Given the likelihood of drugs successfully
treating mental illness, the nature of collateral appeals, and the rarity of
executions, there must be at least one case in which forced medication
will serve the inmate's interests.
2.

Harper'sOverriding Interest Requirement

Assuming the state can establish that treatment is in the inmate's
medical interest, a reviewing court must then consider whether the state
has a sufficiently overriding interest to justify the intrusion. 18' There
appear to be three government interests at stake in medicating an inmate
to determine if he wishes to pursue collateral relief: finality,189 ensuring a
correct sentence and verdict,190 and ensuring all rights have been fully
litigated.' 9'
Under Pennsylvania's PCRA, the government does not require
forced medication of the inmate to achieve its finality interest. The
PCRA does not require the waiver of post-conviction rights be knowing
and intelligent.192 That is, if an inmate were incompetent and thus unable
186. See United States v. Thrasher, 503 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1252 (W.D. Mo. 2007)
(finding approximately 75% to 80% of defendants and 75% to 80% of 4241(d) patients
have been restored to competency in the federal prisons system after being forcibly
medicated, thus 25% to 20% of inmates would not be rendered competent).
187. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 1.
188. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 224-25 (reasonableness test requires showing of a
legitimate government interest); see also Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992)
(characterizing that interest as "overriding").
189. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 164 (1982) (noting society's legitimate
interest in the finality of criminal proceedings has been "perfected" even as a prisoner
engages in a collateral appeal).
190. See United States v. Greer, 538 F.2d 437, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (citing 4 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358) (noting the cardinal principle of Anglo-American

jurisprudence is it is better that ten guilty men go free than one innocent man be
convicted).
191. See Fields v. United States, 466 A.2d 822, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (citing Desist v.
United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262-63 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)) (one purpose of
collateral appeal is ensuring trial and direct appeal conducted in conformity with
constitution).
192. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sam, 952 A.2d 565, 575 (Pa. 2008) (noting PCRA is
waived if not pursued, with no recognized requirement that waiver be knowing or
intelligent). See also People v. Kelly, 822 P.2d 385, 414 (Cal. 1992); Carter v. State, 706
So. 2d 873, 875 (Fla. 1997) (no competency hearing required for a death row inmate's
post conviction proceeding); Council v. Catoe, 597 S.E.2d 782, 787 (S.C. 2004)
(adopting Wisconsin rule that "default rule" is post conviction relief hearings must
proceed even if petitioner is incompetent).
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to determine whether he wishes to initiate an appeal, the appeal would be
automatically waived after the one-year statutory period has elapsed.193
In this scenario, the government will have achieved finality without
forced medication and without expending the resources of litigating
issues on collateral appeal. Even if waivers of collateral appeal rights
must be knowing and intelligent and the filing period would be tolled if
the inmate were incompetent to make such a waiver, some measure of
finality will still have been achieved without forced medication. If the
inmate continues refusing medication and thus remains incompetent to
pursue collateral relief, he will remain in prison indefinitely. 194
While some measure of finality will have been achieved by tolling
the statutory filing period, this solution would not bring true finality to
the proceedings.19 5 The prisoner would still have the prospect of
accepting medication at some future date, presumably following a
favorable retroactive court decision. If this were to happen he could
reopen litigation by filing for habeas corpus relief or state collateral relief
at that time.' 96 Moreover, even if the inmate were in prison until his
natural death, the state's penalty would not have been carried out. Thus
the state's ability to achieve deterrence and adequate retribution through
execution will have been corrupted.197 However, with at least some
measure of finality achieved in the absence of medication, it can be
argued that the state's interest in forcibly medicating the inmate does not
rise to an overriding justification.
Second, the state may have an overriding interest in ensuring the
jury reached the correct verdict and the court imposed the correct
sentence.198 An incorrect guilty verdict, while still satisfying the
193. See, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) (2008); see also, Commonwealth v.
Hoffman, 780 A.2d 700, 703 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (PCRA's time restrictions are
jurisdictional, and thus in the absence of an explicit exception a court may not extend
filing deadlines; mental illness is not an exception to the PCRA time restrictions.).
194. See, e.g., Sam, 952 A.2d at 576 (citing Sam's brief contending the goal of the
death sentence would be met if Sam were to remain in prison indefinitely because he
would be incapacitated, punished by life in prison, and case would be completed).
195. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277-78 (2005) (indefinite stays of execution
hinder finality).
196. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) (2008) (federal habeas petitions permitted in
cases where new evidence is discovered or a new constitutional rule has been enacted
with retroactive applicability); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1) (2008) (permitting collateral
appeals after one-year statute of limitations if a relevant retroactive case were announced
or exculpating evidence discovered).
197. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184 (1976) (acknowledging society views
certain crimes as so grievous that the only adequate response is the imposition of the
death penalty).
198. See, e.g., United States v. Greer, 538 F.2d 437, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (citing 4 W.
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *352); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (U.S.
1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 104 (1959); Coffin v.
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government interest in deterrence,199 would fail to achieve retribution and
would endanger society by allowing a capital offender to escape trial and
punishment. However, once the collateral appeals process has been
reached, there is a strong presumption that the inmate has been properly
convicted. 2 00 The inmate would already have had an opportunity for trial
requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt.2 0 1 In addition, he would have
exhausted his direct appeals of all issues raised at trial.20 2 Given the high
likelihood of all claims being rejected on collateral appeal,203 it seems the
inmate who wishes to delay the imposition of sentence is the only party
with a significant interest in pursuing collateral relief to ensure that a
correct verdict was reached.
Finally, the state has an interest in ensuring courts conduct criminal
proceedings in accordance with constitutional rules.2 04 The collateral
review process furthers this interest by acting as a necessary deterrent
against trial and appellate courts violating constitutional norms in
criminal proceedings.20 5 The importance of this deterrent function was a
central underpinning of the Supreme Court's decision in Teague v.
Lane.206 However, given the rarity of success on collateral appeal,20 7 and
the deterrent function served by direct appeals against trial misconduct, it
is unlikely that forcibly medicating inmates on collateral appeal would
significantly further this government interest.

United States, 156 U.S. 432, 454-56 (1895). But cf Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men,
146 U. PA. L. REv. 173, 195-97 (1997) (acknowledging a contrary position espoused by
Otto von Bismarck and Jeremy Bentham among others).
199. See WILLIAM PALEY, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 553
(Rene Wellek ed., Garland Pub., 1978) (1785) ("he who falls by a mistaken sentence may
be considered as falling for his country").
200. See, e.g., United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165-66 (1982) (noting courts are
entitled to presume outcome following jury trial and direct appeal is correct, thus
justifying a higher burden on collateral than direct appeal).
201. See, e.g., 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3) (2008).
202. See id.
203. See Nancy J. King, Fred L. Cheesman II & Brian J. Ostrom, Final Technical
Report: HabeasLitigation in U.S. District Courts:An EmpiricalStudy ofHabeas Corpus
Cases Filed by State Prisoners Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996, at 51-52 (2007), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/
219559.pdf (finding only 12.4% of habeas petitions in capital cases and only 0.29% of
non-capital cases were granted relief in cases filed between 2000 and 2004).
204. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 306 (1989) (citing Desist v. United States,
394 U.S. 244, 262-63 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (explaining one purpose of habeas
proceedings is to serve as an incentive for courts to follow constitutional standards)).
205. See id.; see also Fields v. United States, 466 A.2d 822 (D.C. Cir 1983).
206. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 306; Tung Yin, A Better Mousetrap: ProceduralDefault
as a Retroactivity Alternative to Teague v. Lane and the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996, 25 Am. J. CRIM. L. 203, 207 (1998) (finding Teague is
premised on finality and deterrence).
207. See King, Cheesman & Ostrom, supra note 203, at 51-52.
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In the absence of any overriding state interest in rendering an
inmate competent to determine whether he wishes to pursue his appeal,
the inmate still has a vested interest in the collateral appeals process. An
innocent death row inmate obviously has an interest in exoneration.
Short of that, many death row inmates desire a reduced sentence.
Additionally, continuing to pursue appeals indefinitely is often an end in
itself for a death row inmate as a means of prolonging his life.208
Moreover, if a knowing and intelligent waiver is not required for the
statutory filing period to lapse, the only way an inmate could prolong the
appeals process is by being rendered competent so he can file his appeal.
Treatment would also aid in a prisoner's ability to file appeals by helping
him choose counsel or relate relevant facts to his appellate counsel.2 09
The inmate will also have an interest in medication apart from
efforts to pursue collateral relief. An inmate has at least some interest in
being healthy and having access to appropriate medical treatment,
including treatment for mental disease.2 10 If, however, the statutory
period would toll while the inmate is incompetent and no sentence could
be carried out prior to the exhaustion of the statutory period, the inmate's
interest in staying alive would likely trump any individual interest in
being healed. Being alive and insane is likely better than being executed
while in good mental health.
Any interest the individual has in medication, however, should not
move the scale in favor of state mandated medication. The Harpertest is
* *211
*
limited to an overriding state, not personal, interest in medication.
This is unsurprising. It would be a waste of resources for the state to
pursue a lawsuit in which it had no interest in the outcome.
V.

ALTERNATIVES TO FORCED MEDICATION

If the state's interest is not sufficiently important to satisfy the
Harper test, there are a number of potential alternatives to forcibly
This section will consider four possible
medicating the inmate.
alternatives to forced medication. First, the state could toll the statutory
208. See, e.g., Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277-78 (2005) (recognizing that death
row inmates attempt to prolong their appeals to delay execution).
209. See, e.g., United States v. Thrasher, 503 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1252 (W.D. Mo.
2007) (forced medication necessary to clear up defendant's disorganized thinking and
make him responsive to counsel).
210. See Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1026 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting being
executed after being rendered competent and remaining insane and in prison indefinitely
are both "unpleasant" circumstances); United States v. Gonzalez-Aguilar, 446 F. Supp.
2d 1099, 1101 (D. Ariz. 2006) (noting prisons have an obligation to provide medical
treatment to inmates).
211. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224-25 (1990) (reasonableness test
requires showing of a legitimate government interest) (emphasis added).
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filing period until the inmate naturally regains competence or consents to
medication. Second, the state could allow the filing period to lapse while
the inmate remains incompetent. Third, the state could appoint a next
friend to litigate the collateral appeal. Finally, the state could adopt a
compromise position where it appoints a next friend to litigate only the
medication issue on behalf of the inmate. Under this final scheme the
statutory filing period could continue to run, but if the next friend
successfully seeks to have the inmate medicated and the inmate becomes
competent, he can choose for himself whether to pursue his appeal in a
timely manner.
A.

Toll the Statutory FilingPeriod

The first alternative to forced medication this comment will
consider is tolling the statutory filing period until the inmate regains
competence naturally or voluntarily accepts medication. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has required such tolling
for habeas appeals under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 212 Tolling the AEDPA's filing period is based on
the statutory right to counsel.213 The court reasoned that communication
is an essential ingredient to effective counsel; an incompetent client
could not be expected to communicate effectively with his attorney.2 14
Therefore, whenever an incompetent petitioner raises a claim that could
potentially benefit from his ability to rationally communicate with his
counsel, the circuit requires equitable tolling of the AEDPA's one-year
statute of limitations.2 15 Collateral proceedings only resume after the
inmate's competence has been restored.2 16
This "solution" fails to satisfy any of the state's interests. There
would be no litigation of issues to ensure the trial and direct appeal were
conducted properly, nor would there be a chance of freeing an innocent
Tolling the filing period would also undermine the
inmate.
government's interest in finality by further prolonging the inmate's
criminal proceedings, which in most cases would have already dragged
on for years.2 17 For example, Herbert Watson had been on death row a

212. See Rohan ex rel. Gates v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 803, 814 (9th Cir. 2003)
(prisoner's incompetence is grounds for equitable tolling).
213. See id. (citing Calderon v. United States Dist. Court, 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9th Cir.
1998), overruledin unrelatedpart by Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202 (2003)).
214. See id.; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2008) (outlining the
attorney's ethical duty of communication with a client regarding his representation).
215. See Calderon, 163 F.3d at 541.
216. See Gates, 334 F.3d at 819.
217. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the average time elapsed from
sentence to execution in 2006 was just over twelve years, or 145 months. See Bureau of
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quarter century, 2 18 and Thavirak Sam had spent seventeen years on death
row 2 19 before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court authorized their forced
medication. Compromising the finality of the proceedings is especially
troubling in cases such as these given the government's heightened
interest in punishing offenders is greatest in capital cases. 2 20
B.

Inmate Who Declines Medication Waives Appeal
Rather than tolling the statutory filing period, the state could

consider the collateral appeals of an inmate who declines medication
waived. This system would most effectively ensure the finality of the
proceedings. With the collateral appeals waived,2 21 the state could
proceed directly to carrying out the sentence of death.222 In addition, this
system would prevent inmates from taking advantage of tolling rules by
filing appeals and then claiming incompetence ad infinitum. 2 2 3
Although holding an inmate responsible for making decisions
regarding his medical care while he is incompetent may seem cruel, it
Some jurisdictions have
would not be wholly without precedent.
recognized that mental illness does not always completely debilitate the
brain.2 24 Rather, it often strikes at only limited areas of functioning,
allowing many mentally ill individuals to retain the ability to address
certain situations competently. 225 In fact, some states maintain a
presumption that committed mental patients are competent to manage

Justice Statistics, Capital Punishment 2006, Table 11 (2007), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/html/cp/2006/tables/cp06stl I.htm.
218. Commonwealth v. Watson, 952 A.2d 541, 544 (Pa. 2008) (Watson convicted on
November 10, 1983, and forced medication approved July 22, 2008).
219. Commonwealth v. Sam, 952 A.2d 565, 568 (Pa. 2008) (Sam convicted on July 2,
2008, and forced medication approved July 22, 2008).
220. See Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1025 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting capital
cases involve the most serious crimes where society's interest in deterrence and
retribution are most critical).
221. Under the federal habeas rules, however, successive petitions are permitted in
cases where new evidence is discovered or a new constitutional rule has been enacted
with retroactive applicability, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) (2008). See also 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9545(b)(1) (2008) (permitting collateral appeals after one-year statute of limitations if a
relevant retroactive case was announced or exculpating evidence discovered).
222. This presumably would then invite litigation over whether the state can medicate
to execute. See, e.g., Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018; State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746
(La. 1992); Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d 53 (S.C. 1993).
223. See, e.g., Gates, 334 F.3d at 819 n. 11 (limiting equitable tolling of habeas
claims to the first petition to avoid potential for abuse by inmates).
224. See, e.g., Riese v. St. Mary's Hospital, 209 Cal. App. 3d 1303, 1321 (Ca. Ct.
App. First District 1987) (quoting Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 342 (N.Y. 1986)); see
also Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1361 (D. Mass. 1979); Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F.
Supp. 915, 927 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
225. See Rivers, 495 N.E.2d at 342.
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their affairs, including deciding a course of medical treatment.
Assuming this presumption is proper, a system that waives the appeals of
inmates who refuse treatment would simply prevent abuse by prisoners
who choose to delay the conclusion of their appeals.
In spite of the ability of some incompetent inmates to decide a
course of treatment, waiving the collateral appeal of an individual who
failed to file an appeal due to incompetence is likely unfairly harsh.
Incompetent individuals would, in effect, be punished for their mental
illness. Even conceding that some inmates, incompetent to determine
whether to pursue an appeal, are competent to determine whether to seek
medical treatment, such a rule is inappropriate given the stakes of the
litigation. Endorsing a rule allowing a mentally ill individual to make
decisions that may result in his execution fails to acknowledge the
unique nature of the death penalty. Such a result, given the high stakes,
would undermine the state's "failsafe" purpose in providing collateral
227
review.
C.

Next Friend

The state could also appoint a next friend for all incompetent
inmates after their direct appeals become final and before the statute of
limitations ends. The next friend doctrine has been used at least since the
English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679.228 The Supreme Court endorsed the
next friend concept in federal habeas proceedings, 2 29 and it is widely
used in the states when potential petitioners are incompetent. 230 In 1948,
Congress codified the common law next friend doctrine 23 1 in the federal
habeas corpus statute.232 The Court interpreted this statutory doctrine to
require:

226. See, e.g., Okin, 478 F. Supp. at 1361.
227. See Commonwealth v. Watson, 952 A.2d 541, 555 (2008); Commonwealth v.
Sam, 952 A.2d 565, 574-75 (2008).
228. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 162 (1990) (citing 31 Car. II, ch. 2)
(permitting complaints to be filed on behalf of detained individuals)).
229. See Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 161-62.
230. See Caroline Nasrallah Belk, Next Friend Standing and the War on Terror, 53
DUKE L.J. 1747, 1750-51 (2004) (noting many state constitutions and statutes explicitly
authorize next friend standing, e.g., Ariz. Const. art. VI, 5; Ala. Code 15-21-4; Colo Rev.
Stat. 13-45-101; Ga. Code 9-14-4).
231. See 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (2008) (amended by Act of June 25, 1948) (citing United
States ex rel. Funaro v. Watchom, 164 F. 152, 153 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1908) (permitting filing
of habeas petitions on detainee's behalf in cases of incompetence); Collins v. Traeger, 27
F.2d 842, 843 (9th Cir. 1928) (finding next friend doctrine implied in statute)).
232. See 28 U.S.C. § 2242 ("Application for a writ of habeas corpus shall be in
writing signed and verified by the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone
acting in his behalf") (emphasis added).
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1. The next friend provide adequate explanation, including
mental incompetence, to show why the real party in interest
cannot appear on his own behalf;233
2. The next friend be dedicated to the best interest of the person
on whose behalf he is seeking to litigate; 234 and
3. The next friend have some significant relationship with the
real party in interest. 235
The next friend doctrine was available in Pennsylvania for Sam and
Watson. 236 However, the Commonwealth argued the use of a next friend
was an inadequate solution, claiming next friend litigation would not
bring sufficient finality to the process.23 7 The court agreed.238 In Watson
the court was concerned that if Watson regained competence after the
conclusion of the next friend's litigation of the collateral appeal that he
would seek a second bite at the apple.239 In Sam, finality could not be
achieved because no next friend could be found.240
A more significant issue, however, is whether the next friend
doctrine is actually less intrusive than forced medication. 24 ' Forced
medication obviously presents a serious invasion of an individual's
liberty interest. 242 However, the Court has recognized the right to preside

233. See Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163 (citing Wilson v. Lane, 870 F.2d 1250, 1253 (7th
Cir. 1989); Smith ex rel. Missouri Public Defender Comm'n v. Armontrout, 812 F.2d
1050, 1053 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1033 (1987); Weber v. Garza, 570
F.2d 511, 513-14 (5th Cir. 1978)).
234. See Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163 (citing Morris v. United States, 399 F. Supp. 720,
722 (E.D. Va. 1975)).
235. See Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 164.
236. See Commonwealth v. Haag, 809 A.2d 271, 278 (Pa. 2002) (holding a death row
inmate may proceed with his collateral appeals using a next friend).
237. See Commonwealth v. Watson, 952 A.2d 541, 557-58 (Pa. 2008) (noting
Watson's counsel claimed right to file further challenges if Watson were to regain
competence); Commonwealth v. Sam, 952 A.2d 565, 575 (Pa. 2008) (arguing next friend
would result in a permanent stay of execution because no acceptable next friend is readily
available).
238. See Watson, 952 A.2d at 560; Sam, 952 A.2d at 578.
239. Watson, 952 A.2d at 560.
240. Sam, 952 A.2d at 578.
241. If the forced medication of inmates to render them competent to pursue their
collateral appeals is opposed because it represents an unjustifiable invasion of the
inmates' privacy interests, see, e.g., Watson, 952 A.2d at 563 (Baer, J., dissenting), then
the next friend should be opposed if it represents an even greater invasion of that liberty
interest.
242. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990) (quoting
Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)) ("No right is held more sacred,
or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the
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over one's own criminal defense is protected by the Sixth Amendment.243
This right of autonomy is a bedrock principle of the American criminal
justice system 244 dating back to our British common law roots.2 4 5
Because the defendant bears the burden of the outcome of his trial, he
must be free to make his own choices regarding his defense.24 6
This logic applies with equal force in the case of criminal appeals.
While the Court has rejected an absolute right to argue one's own appeal
at oral argument,247 the right of the convict to decide whether to pursue
an appeal remains inviolate. 24 8 Even in death penalty cases, where the
waiver of appeals results in the inmate's death, the right of an inmate to
waive his appeals has been undisturbed. 2 49 Applying the next friend
system in these circumstances deprives an inmate of his right to decide
how to pursue an appeal, or more fundamentally, whether to pursue an
appeal. 25 0 The harm of this deprivation is amplified, as the defendant's

possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others,
unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.") (emphasis added).
243. See generally Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975) (relying on British
common law, American law at the time of the founding, and structure of the Sixth
Amendment to find the Constitution guarantees the right to refuse counsel because
individuals must have free choice to preside over their own criminal defense); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1654 (2008) (parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally in all courts of
the United States).
244. Id. at 834.
245. See id. at 821-822 (claiming the only departure from the rule allowing
defendants to decide the course of their defense was the infamous Star Chamber, where
answers to indictments were not accepted unless signed by a counsel appointed by the
tribunal. When counsel refused to sign, the defendant was considered to have
confessed.).
246. See id. at 834 (holding a defendant's choices must be honored "out of 'that
respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law').
247. See Martinez v. Court of Appeal, 528 U.S. 152, 163 (2000) (citing Price v.
Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948)).
248. See, e.g., Comer v. Schriro, 480 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (citing
Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1016-17 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring)) (holding
once competent petitioner waives further appeal a court may not consider case regardless
of an issue's merit), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2455 (2007).
249. See John H. Blume, Killing the Willing: "Volunteers, "Suicide and Competency,
103 MICH. L. REv. 939, 939-40 (2005) (noting of the 885 executions carried out since
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), 106, including the first, have involved
"volunteers," that is inmates who have waived their appeals); Adam Liptak, Another Kind
of Appeal from Death Row: Kill Me, N.Y. TIMES, March 12, 2007, at A14 (as of 2007
number of volunteers was still approximately 10%).
According to Blume, 100% of those executed in Pennsylvania, Idaho, New Mexico,
and Oregon since Gregg were volunteers. Blume, at 966. Pennsylvania's inclusion on
this list is telling, as it has the fourth highest death row population, 220 individuals. Only
California, Texas, and Florida have more prisoners on death row. See Bureau of Justice
Statistics, supra note 1.
250. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Watson, 952 A.2d 541, 548 (Pa. 2008) (next friend
sought exoneration although inmate stated he wished to be put to death).
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interest in a successful appeal is heightened by the sentence of death. 251
When viewed in this light, forcibly medicating an inmate so he can make
his own decisions regarding his appeals is a comparatively minor
invasion. This is especially true in cases such as these, where the state
has already been authorized to kill the inmate if the appeals fail.
D.

Next Friend Only Litigates Medication Issue

States, like
Finally, states could adopt a hybrid approach.
Pennsylvania, can preserve their rule requiring appeals not filed in a
timely manner be waived. However, rather than the state suing to
forcibly medicate the inmate so the inmate can determine whether he
wishes to invoke his right to appeal, the state could cede control of the
medication issue to a next friend. That is, if the next friend believed
medication was in the inmate's medical or legal interest, the next friend
could sue to have him medicated. If not, the next friend could decline to
litigate the medication issue on the inmate's behalf and allow the filing
period to run.
The state could do this by following the guidelines by which it
authorizes a guardian ad litem to make decisions for an incompetent
individual, including authorizing medication when it is in the patient's
best medical interest. 2 52 If the next friend opted to forgo medication the
appeal would be waived. If the next friend opted to seek medication for
the inmate, after the inmate regained competence he could determine for
himself whether he wished to pursue an appeal and whether he wished to
continue taking the medication.
This system would solve some of the problems associated with the
state making decisions regarding an inmate's medication. It would
prevent the state from seeking medication solely to further its own
interest. And it would allow those with the inmate's interest at heart to
advocate on the inmate's behalf regarding his medical treatment. In
addition, provided that the next friend sought to have the inmate
medicated, these procedures would protect an inmate's right to autonomy
in deciding how and whether to pursue any collateral relief. It would

251. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994 (1991) (Scalia, J., announcing the
judgment of the Court and writing for himself and Chief Justice Rehnquist) (noting the
Eighth Amendment requires extra protections when the penalty of death has been
imposed due to the unique status of the death penalty).
252. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 182 (2003) (citing Ala. Code §§ 26-2A102(a), 26-2A-105, 26-2A-108 (Michie 1992); Alaska Stat. §§ 13.26.105(a),
13.26.116(b) (2002); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-5303, 14-5312 (West 1995); Ark. Code
Ann. §§ 28-65-205, 28-65-301 (1987)) (noting every state provides procedures for
appointing a guardian to authorize medication when in a patient's best interest).
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also ensure that an inmate is only making decisions affecting his
collateral appeals while competent.
However, this approach would not solve all problems associated
with incompetent inmates pursuing collateral appeals. In a significant
number of cases medication will not restore the inmate's competence.2 53
In these cases, a next friend will still likely need to be appointed to
litigate the inmate's rights on collateral appeal. Moreover, although the
state would not be put in the position of actively seeking to medicate an
individual against his will, the practical effect of a rule requiring the
statutory filing period to run while the inmate is incompetent would
likely result in the next friend automatically seeking to medicate the
inmate regardless of his medical needs. Finally, the effect of employing
additional procedures to require a "next friend" to litigate the defendant's
medication will add cost and time to a process that already takes years
and costs hundreds of thousands of dollars with likely only a marginal
benefit to the inmates.2 54
VI. CONCLUSION

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court likely reached the correct decision
in both Commonwealth v. Sam 25 5 and Commonwealth v. Watson.2 56 The
Court was not charged with finding the "best" solution, but rather with
determining whether the Commonwealth's solution was permissible.
Forced medication was a reasonable means of furthering the
Commonwealth's interests in achieving finality, reaching a correct
verdict and sentence, and litigating relevant issues. Significantly, forced
medication also furthered the inmates' interests in being healthy,
preserving their collateral appeals, and in retaining autonomy over their
cases. While employing a Sell analysis was inappropriate in these
particular circumstances, evaluating the Commonwealth's order to
medicate using Harper would reach the same result.
Even if forced medication is not the optimal solution to the problem
presented in Sam and Watson, it was legally justifiable under existing
federal case law and was likely the best of the options presented to the
court. Using a next friend would not have adequately preserved the
inmates' autonomy interests or the Commonwealth's finality interest.
And tolling the statutory filing period would have failed to satisfy the
253. See United States v. Thrasher, 503 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1252 (W.D. Mo. 2007).
254. See Justin Brooks and Jeanne Huey Erickson, The Dire Wolf Collects His Due
While the Boys Sit by the Fire: Why Michigan Cannot Afford to Buy into the Death
Penalty, 13 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 877, 885-901 (2005) (examining the costs of imposing
the death penalty).
255. Commonwealth v. Sam, 952 A.2d 565 (Pa. 2008).
256. Commonwealth v. Watson, 952 A.2d 541 (Pa. 2008).
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Commonwealth's interest in finality of litigation. Ultimately, the
Pennsylvania decision may not have been perfect, but it was likely as
close as it gets this side of heaven, which, unfortunately, may be little
comfort to those inmates whom the state intends to send to the other.

